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 
Abstract—Variability of the space radiation environment is 
investigated with regard to parts categorization for total dose 
hardness assurance methods.  It is shown that it can have a 
significant impact.  A modified approach is developed that uses 
current environment models more consistently and replaces the 
radiation design margin concept with one of failure probability 
during a mission. 
 
Index Terms—displacement damage dose, radiation hardness 
assurance, radiation design margin, total ionizing dose 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hardness assurance (HA) methodology should ensure that 
electronic piece parts in a space system perform to design 
specifications after exposure to the space environment.  
Detailed descriptions of radiation HA methodology have been 
given in the 2002 and 2004 Nuclear and Space Radiation 
Effects Conference Short Courses [1], [2], and elsewhere [3].  
Fig.1 shows an overview of the radiation HA process used at 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), taken from 
reference 1.  Starting from the mission requirements there are 
two branches of analysis that feed into parts categorization, 
describing their acceptability for flight.  This is currently 
based on radiation design margin (RDM).  The RDM is defined 
as the mean of the radiation failure level of the part, Rmf, 
divided by the radiation specification level derived from the 
environment, Rspec. 
𝑅𝐷𝑀 =
𝑅𝑚𝑓
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐
                                 (1) 
Determining the mean failure level of a part generally 
requires analysis of the lot or lots of devices to be flown along 
with system and circuit design to define a distribution of total 
dose failure levels.  On the other hand, the radiation 
specification level, i.e., total dose level determined from the 
space environment, is taken as a fixed quantity even though 
the radiation environment is dynamic and must be predicted 
years in advance in order to incorporate requirements into the 
mission design.  The reason behind this is largely historical. It 
results from the deterministic nature of the long-time standard 
Aerospace Proton Model-8/Aerospace Electron Model-8 
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(AP8/AE8) trapped particle models that are used to evaluate 
the total dose environment within the Earth’s magnetosphere 
[4], [5].  In contrast, the new AP9/AE9 models are 
probabilistic in nature.  They allow full Monte Carlo 
calculations for evaluating the dynamics of the trapped 
particle environment [6].  This is consistent with widely used 
solar proton models, which take the probabilistic approach [7]-
[9].  Making use of probabilistic models for both trapped 
particles and solar protons allows the complete probability 
distribution of total dose values for any orbit to be evaluated 
for the first time.  This provides additional useful information 
to designers because the environment variability is fully 
quantified.  The new information can be inserted into the flow 
of the radiation HA process in the upper right box shown in 
Fig.1 to provide a more complete and consistent analysis for 
parts categorization.  Parts categorization is central to 
radiation HA methodology because it determines part 
acceptability and whether or not lot acceptance testing should 
be performed. 
Section II shows how the probability distribution for total 
dose failure of a lot(s) of devices is combined with the 
probability distribution of possible total dose values during a 
planned mission to obtain a predicted device failure 
probability during the mission.  The end result is that use of 
this failure probability replaces the use of RDM.  Examples for 
both total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage dose 
(DDD) are given.  Section III discusses implications for 
radiation HA.  Section IV presents conclusions. 
II. METHODS AND RESULTS 
A. Derivation of Failure Probability during a Mission 
 Suppose one or more similar lots of devices is total dose 
tested in a laboratory.  G(x) is the measured cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) and 𝑔(𝑥) is the corresponding 
probability density function (PDF) for failure doses of the 
devices.  The probability of device failure for a dose that lies 
between x and x + dx is therefore 𝑔(𝑥)𝑑𝑥, where the dose x is 
determined by experiment.  The driving physical factors 
behind the space radiation environment are not entirely 
understood, making it challenging to predict ahead of time.  
Thus, when designing for a space mission it is useful to model 
this dynamic environment probabilistically.  If the CDF for the 
space radiation dose is given by H(x) and the PDF is h(x), then 
the probability a device is exposed to a dose that exceeds x 
during the mission is 1 – H(x).  A common assumption in the 
radiation effects community is that dose is a valid parameter 
for predicting device failure, i.e., a unit dose in the laboratory 
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Fig. 1.  Overview of the radiation hardness assurance process, taken from C. Poivey [1]. 
is equivalent to a unit dose in space.  For situations where 
differences may occur such as devices subject to enhanced low 
dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS) or annealing, it is assumed the 
laboratory tests are done in a manner to accurately represent 
the failure distribution expected in the space radiation 
environment.  This can often be accomplished by testing at an 
appropriately low dose rate but other approaches also exist 
that can potentially bound or approximate the low dose rate 
response [10], [11]. 
These two distributions can then be combined to obtain the 
probability for a total dose failure during the mission for dose 
interval x to x + dx.  It is 
 
[1 − 𝐻(𝑥)] ∙ 𝑔(𝑥)𝑑𝑥                               (2) 
 
Integrating over all possible dose values gives the total dose 
failure probability, 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 , during the mission. 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 =  ʃ [1 − 𝐻(𝑥)] ∙ 𝑔(𝑥)𝑑𝑥                     (3) 
 
To be clear, 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙  is the probability of a total dose failure for 
a device randomly selected from the lot(s) characterized by 
G(x) in the space environment characterized by H(x).  The 
failure can be either due to TID or DDD, depending on the 
device vulnerability. 
B. Device Total Dose Failure Distribution, G(x) 
Piece-part failure can be defined in terms of parametric or 
functional failure.  In the examples considered here parametric 
failures are used.  This generally requires circuit analysis to 
identify the most critical parameters for system operation.  
Standard methods for determining the dose failure 
distributions have been described in detail [1]-[3] as well as 
new methods that use Bayesian statistics [12] and techniques 
for building large data sets [13].  Adding to this particular 
literature is beyond the scope of this paper.  The illustrative 
examples shown here were obtained by the standard method 
outlined by Pease for fitting a lognormal distribution to the 
failure levels of a lot(s) of devices [2]. 
Fig.2 shows degradation of DC current gain as a function of 
ionizing dose for Solid State Devices, Inc. SFT2907A bipolar 
transistors.  These devices are used for high speed, low power 
applications and were tested for the Magnetospheric 
MultiScale (MMS) flight project.  Ten devices from a single 
lot date code were irradiated using the gamma ray facility at 
NASA/GSFC to a total dose of 100 krad(Si), with an 
additional device used as a control.  Results shown here for 
DC current gain are with a 10 V collector-emitter bias and 1 
mA collector current. 
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Fig. 2.  DC current gain degradation as a function of Co-60 gamma ray dose 
for ten Solid State Devices, Inc. SFT2907A bipolar transistors. 
 
Parametric failure occurs when the space system no longer 
operates properly because the transistor gain has degraded to a 
certain level.  Under the test conditions described for Fig.2 it 
is assumed that parametric failure occurs at the dose where the 
gain falls below the manufacturer’s minimum specification of 
100.  The failure distribution for the 10 devices was then put 
in the form of a cumulative probability by ranking the failure 
doses from 1 to 10 and dividing the rank, m, by N + 1, where 
N is the number of devices.  The results are shown by the 
points in Fig.3.  The points were then fit to a lognormal 
distribution shown by the line in the figure.  This fit represents 
the CDF, G(x), where x is TID.  The correlation coefficient of 
the fit is 0.981.  Since the lognormal parameters are now 
known they can be used to obtain the PDF, 𝑔(𝑥), used in 
equation 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  TID failure distribution for the SFT2907A bipolar transistor.  The line 
is a lognormal fit to the data. 
 
For the situation where parts have a guaranteed hardness 
level it may not be necessary to test.  In that case G(x) can be 
taken as a step function with the 0 to 1 probability transition at 
the guaranteed hardness level. 
Next a DDD failure distribution for the Amptek, Inc. 
HV801 optocoupler is obtained.  This is a high voltage 
commercial part rated for 8 kV operation of the detection 
photodiode.  These are GaAlAs parts manufactured in a liquid 
phase epitaxially grown process.  The data were taken by the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory group for the JUpiter Near-polar 
Orbiter (Juno) flight project.  Experiments using 50 MeV 
protons at the University of California, Davis Cyclotron 
Facility resulted in the degradation of current transfer ratio 
(CTR) shown in Fig.4.  Experiments with Co-60 gamma rays 
showed no measureable effect on the optocouplers.  It is 
therefore assumed that the CTR degradation is due to 
displacement damage in the Light Emitting Diode (LED) [14].  
Parametric failure is taken as the point where the CTR 
degrades to 0.01.   
The conversion of proton fluence to DDD is given by 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐶 ∙ 𝑁𝐼𝐸𝐿 ∙  𝜙                           (4) 
where NIEL is the non-ionizing energy loss [15] for 50 MeV 
protons in GaAlAs, ϕ is the proton fluence and C is a unit 
conversion.  The NIEL value used was 4.044 x 10-3 MeV-
cm2/g.  For fluence expressed in units of cm-2 and C taken as 
unity, DDD is in units of MeV/g.  In an analogous fashion to 
that shown in Fig.3 the DDD failure levels of the 6 parts can 
be ranked and plotted as a cumulative probability.  This is 
shown by the points in Fig.5.  A lognormal distribution was fit 
to these data and shown by the line in the figure.  The 
correlation coefficient of the fit is 0.930.  This is taken as the 
failure distribution, G(x), where x is DDD. 
 
Fig. 4.  CTR degradation for the HV801 optocoupler as a function of 50 MeV 
proton fluence.  For clarity, the top curve has its CTR incremented by 0.002 at 
each data point. 
 
Fig. 5.  DDD failure distribution for the HV801 optocoupler.  The line is a 
lognormal fit to the data. 
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TABLE I 
Orbits analyzed and corresponding radiation models used. 
Orbit Altitude (km) Inclination Duration Comments Models Used 
Low Inclination LEO 569 28.5o 1 year HST Orbit AP9, AE9 
Polar LEO 705 98.2o 1 year Landsat-8 Orbit AP9, AE9, ESP 
GEO 35,786 0o 1 & 10 years 0o longitude AP9, AE9, ESP 
 
C. Space Radiation Environment Dose Distribution, H(x) 
In order to evaluate the failure probability of a device 
during a mission as expressed by equation 3, the dose that the 
device will receive in space should be described 
probabilistically.  There are many possibilities in terms of 
orbits and mission duration combinations.  Three illustrative 
orbits in the near-Earth region are considered that have 
significantly different radiation environments.  The first is a 
low-inclination, low Earth orbit (LEO).  Here spacecraft are 
exposed to trapped protons in the South Atlantic Anomaly, 
and trapped electrons but are well-shielded from solar protons 
by the geomagnetic field.  This is an orbit with moderate total 
dose exposure.  The orbital altitude and inclination chosen 
were those of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST).  Next a 
polar LEO or sun synchronous orbit is considered.  Doses are 
somewhat more severe in this orbit because the trapped 
electron flux is greater and the spacecraft is only partially 
protected from solar protons.  The altitude and inclination 
were chosen to match that of the Landsat-8 spacecraft.  
Thirdly, a geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) was chosen.  This 
orbit is exposed to the intense outer electron belt and solar 
protons that are essentially unattenuated by the Earth’s 
magnetic field.  In GEO there are also trapped protons but 
they are stopped by very light shielding due to their low 
energy at this altitude. 
 
All three orbits were examined for a 1-year mission 
duration for baseline comparisons.  In addition the GEO was 
evaluated for a 10-year mission duration in order to assess the 
device failure probabilities for a longer period of time that is 
more appropriate for many GEO missions.  The radiation 
models used were AP9/AE9 [6] and Emission of Solar Protons 
(ESP) [9].  For the case of the polar LEO solar proton 
attenuation was accounted for using the Magnetocosmics 
simulation as implemented in the Space Environment 
Information System (SPENVIS) [16].  A summary of the 
orbital information and radiation models used for each 
environment is given in Table I. 
The AP9/AE9 Monte Carlo code, version 1.30, was used to 
simulate 99 histories for each orbit and mission duration 
combination.  The orbit generator was run for the full mission 
length in all cases, either 1 or 10 years, to account for space 
weather variability built into the Monte Carlo version of the 
code.  Time steps chosen were either 10 seconds for LEO or 1 
hour for GEO.  Resulting energy spectra for protons and 
electrons were transported through solid sphere aluminum 
shielding ranging from 10 to 1000 mils using the Numerical 
Optimizations, Visualizations, and Integrations on Computer 
Aided Design (CAD)/Constructive Solid Geometry (CSG) 
Edifices (NOVICE) radiation transport code [17].  
Transported spectra were then converted to TID and DDD.  
The resulting doses for protons and electrons were then 
separately ranked by percentile according to m/(N+1), where 
m is the ordered rank of the dose and N the number of 
histories.  This allows both the trapped proton doses and 
trapped electron doses to be ordered from the 1 to 99 
percentile or confidence level.  Solar proton doses, both TID 
and DDD, were calculated with the ESP model and the 
NOVICE transport code for each integral percentile ranging 
from 1 to 99.  The doses for trapped protons, trapped electrons 
and solar protons were then added for the same confidence 
level and shielding thickness. 
Figs.6 and 7 show TID results for the 1-year low inclination 
LEO and 1-year GEO missions.  Each curve represents the 
function H(x) for a specified shielding level.    Under lightly 
shielded conditions the doses expected for the GEO orbit are 2 
to 3 orders of magnitude higher, depending on confidence 
level.  However, the doses in this electron dominated orbit fall 
off quickly with increased shielding and become more 
comparable to the LEO under heavily shielded conditions.  
The width of the distributions shown represents the TID 
variability for all significant ionizing radiation in these orbits.  
It is noteworthy that the distribution width is comparable to 
the width of the failure distribution shown in Fig.3, showing 
the importance of environment variability for TID. 
Figs.8 and 9 show DDD results for the same two orbits.  
These results are used in equation 3 for the function H(x).  
Compared to the ionization case, the difference in DDD is 
much less for the two orbits under lightly shielded conditions.  
The main reason is that electrons, which dominate the GEO 
environment, are not efficient at producing displacements due 
to the large mismatch in mass with the GaAlAs target 
elements.  DDD in GEO is more easily shielded against, as 
can be seen in Fig.9 by the translation of the curves leftward 
with increased shielding as compared to Fig.8.  However, it is 
interesting to note the broad increase in the distribution width 
for GEO, particularly at high levels of shielding.  There are at 
least two contributing factors that can be seen from equation 4.  
The first is that the electron fluence reaching a given shielding 
depth is highly statistical due to the large scattering angles 
electrons can be deflected at when interacting with a target 
atom.  This can also be seen to a limited extent in Fig.7 for the 
case of ionization.  The more significant reason is that the 
electron must have at least a few hundred keV of kinetic 
energy to displace an atom so electron NIEL consequently 
drops sharply for energies below about 1 MeV [15].  The 
resulting statistics of displacement damage energy loss in this 
energy region lead to a broad distribution for the high 
shielding levels considered.  Figs. 8 and 9 show the DDD 
variability for all radiations that contribute significantly to 
displacement damage in these orbits.  Note that depending on 
the level of shielding the width of the distribution can be much 
broader than the width of the failure distribution shown in 
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Fig.5, indicating the importance of environment variability for 
DDD. 
The polar LEO results turned out to be intermediate to the 
other two orbits, as expected.  This will be discussed in the 
following section along with results for the 10-year GEO. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  TID probability distributions for a 1-year low inclination LEO 
mission.  Each curve contains 99 points corresponding to confidence levels 
ranging from 1 to 99%.  Shielding levels for the curves, from right to left, are 
10, 50, 100, 200, 500 and 1000 mils Al.  See Table I for orbital parameters. 
 
 
Fig.7.  TID probability distributions for a 1-year GEO mission.  Each curve 
contains 99 points corresponding to confidence levels ranging from 1 to 99%.  
Shielding levels for the curves, from right to left, are 10, 50, 100, 200, 500 
and 1000 mils Al.  See Table I for orbital parameters. 
 
 
Fig. 8.  DDD probability distributions for a 1-year low inclination LEO 
mission.  Each curve contains 99 points corresponding to confidence levels 
ranging from 1 to 99%.  Shielding levels for the curves, from right to left, are 
10, 50, 100, 200, 500 and 1000 mils Al.  See Table I for orbital parameters. 
 
Fig.9.  DDD probability distributions for a 1-year GEO mission.  Each curve 
contains 99 points corresponding to confidence levels ranging from 1 to 99%.  
Shielding levels for the curves, from right to left, are 10, 50, 100, 200, 500 
and 1000 mils Al.  See Table I for orbital parameters. 
D. Total Dose Failure Probability during a Mission 
The failure probability for a device during a mission can 
now be calculated.  For the bipolar devices this is done by 
combining the probability distribution for device failure 
shown in Fig.3 with a space radiation dose distribution for a 
given orbit and level of shielding such as those shown in 
Figs.6 and 7, using equation 3.  The resulting failure 
probability, 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 , depends on the proximity of the two 
distributions along the dose axis.  If the device failure 
distribution is at much greater doses than the environment 
dose distribution the failure probability is 0.  Conversely if the 
environment dose distribution is at much greater doses the 
failure probability is 1.  When the two distributions overlap 
the failure probability is between 0 and 1. 
Failure probabilities for the bipolar transistor are shown in 
Fig.10 as a function of shield thickness for all orbits and 
mission durations indicated in Table I.  These were obtained 
by numerically integrating equation 3 using the appropriate 
probability distributions.  It is seen that for 1-year missions the 
transistors should have at least 25, 50 and 200 mils of 
aluminum shield in low inclination LEO, polar LEO and GEO, 
respectively, to lower the failure probability to near zero.  In 
order to extend the GEO mission from 1 to 10 years 
approximately 100 mils of additional shielding is required to 
maintain 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙  near 0. 
 
Fig. 10.  Failure probabilities for the SFT2907A bipolar transistor as a 
function of shield thickness for different orbits and mission durations. 
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Fig.11 shows the failure probabilities for the HV801 
optocoupler calculated in an analogous manner using DDD as 
the variable x in equation 3.  The same general trends are seen 
for the different orbits considered.  It is interesting to note that 
the resulting curves from the last two figures provide a 
ranking of the severity of threats for different devices, 
regardless of whether it is due to TID or DDD. 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Failure probabilities for the HV801 optocoupler as a function of 
shield thickness for different orbits and mission durations. 
III. DISCUSSION – RADIATION HARDNESS ASSURANCE 
The two generally accepted radiation analyses that lead to 
part categorization shown in Fig.1 have been discussed.  First 
the distribution of part failures due to total dose is accounted 
for.  Second the total dose space environment is analyzed.  
Until recently the available space radiation environment tools 
did not have the capability to allow this to be done on a 
consistent basis.  The environment has typically been 
evaluated by combining results from deterministic trapped 
particle models and probabilistic solar proton models.  This 
leads to a total dose value for a specified shielding and 
assignment of an arbitrary RDM to account for its uncertainty.  
However, the dynamic nature of the environment and the need 
to forecast it years in advance suggests a probabilistic 
approach is preferable.  The availability of the AP9/AE9 
Monte Carlo code, when combined with a probabilistic solar 
proton model, now allows a more consistent approach to be 
taken.  As shown in section II, this results in modifying parts 
categorization by replacing RDM with failure probability, 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 .  𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙  represents the probability of a total dose failure 
during a mission for a device randomly selected from the 
lot(s) to be flown, accounting for the distribution of possible 
total dose environments.  It is free of the arbitrariness of 
choosing an RDM. 
The RDM has a long history of use in the radiation effects 
community.  It is therefore worthwhile to compare RDM with 
confidence level for a given environment.  This can be done 
using figures such as 6 – 9 if the assumption is made that the 
50% confidence level is equivalent to an RDM of 1.  Values of 
RDM greater than 1 are then obtained by taking the ratio of the 
dose at the confidence level of interest to the dose at the 50% 
confidence level.  This applies to both TID and DDD.   
Comparisons are shown in Fig.12 for the 10-year GEO, which 
is the most challenging orbit for total dose requirements 
considered in this paper.  Results are for a shielding level of 
200 mils of aluminum, a reasonable starting point for a large 
spacecraft intended for a 10-year mission in GEO.  A 
commonly applied RDM is a factor of 2, although this varies 
across organizations and even for particular applications.  The 
figure shows that for the case of ionization this corresponds to 
a high confidence level, approximately 96%.  This is expected, 
as part selection for total dose effects is generally quite 
conservative.  For the case of DDD an RDM of times 2 
corresponds to a confidence level of about 79%.  This is less 
than the ionization case because of the broadness of the DDD 
distributions in GEO, as shown in Fig.9.  This reflects the 
inconsistency and the “catch-all” nature of RDM, which is 
used to cover uncertainties in both the environment and the 
device failure distribution for various applications.  
Difficulties can arise because environment uncertainties are 
dependent on the particular orbit, mission duration and 
environment dynamics.  In addition the piece part failure 
distribution can vary significantly from a mean failure level 
and is not accounted for by equation 1 [18]. 
 
Fig. 12.  Comparison of confidence level using the current methodology to 
RDM for a 10-year mission in GEO and 200 mils of Al shielding.  Results are 
shown for both TID and DDD. 
 
Changing over from an RDM- to a 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙-based approach has 
favorable implications at the system and spacecraft level 
because the failure probability is more directly related to the 
reliable operation of a circuit than design margin.  This would 
allow total dose failures to be included in spacecraft level 
reliability analyses as part of an overall probabilistic model, a 
procedure not currently being implemented at NASA. 
The exact level of acceptable failure probability will be 
related to the risk the flight project is willing to take.  This in 
turn is related to many factors such as whether the mission is 
manned or robotic, mission goals and cost. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
An approach was presented that accounts for the 
variability of the space radiation environment in total dose 
hardness assurance methodology.  Two example 
applications were demonstrated using bipolar transistor and 
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optocoupler data.  Although other devices need to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis, the results obtained 
showed that variability in the total dose space environment 
was at least as significant as the variability of the device 
failure distributions obtained from laboratory tests, 
suggesting this approach provides a more complete and 
thorough radiation HA analysis.  The main improvements in 
this approach are two-fold.  First, the full probabilistic 
nature of each space radiation model is used, leading to a 
more consistent assessment of the radiation environment in 
terms of confidence levels across all radiations.  Second, 
parts categorization is accomplished by evaluating failure 
probability, 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 , instead of RDM.  The advantages of using 
failure probability are that it is an objectively determined 
parameter that better characterizes device radiation 
performance.  It allows direct comparison of the total dose 
threats for different devices, regardless of whether it is TID 
or DDD.  Finally, it is more amenable to circuit, system and 
spacecraft reliability analyses. 
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